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Mar.-Apr., 1957
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
The past year' was not an active one in Colorado for domestic
relations law. The only cases of striking interest to the practitioner
in this field concern the law of delinquency and adoption.
A broader view of the year's developments in the national law
of marriage and the family can be obtained from a recent excellent
article which should be of value to Colorado lawyers and judges.*-'
MARRIAGE
The only case involving marriage reiterated the Supreme
Court's position that the capacity of persons to marry, at least so
far as age is concerned, is governed by the law of the place where
the marriage is contracted. In Spencer v. People' the court held
that a marriage contracted in Utah between persons domiciled in
Colorado was valid even though the girl was only fifteen years old,
where the Utah statute fixed the age of consent to marry at four-
teen for the female. The court relied on the Colorado statute which
provides that marriages contracted outside the state are valid if
valid by the law of the place where contracted.
4
DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
Questions of divorce procedure and defenses were dealt with
in Collins v. Collins.' The plaintiff-wife brought a first divorce ac-
tion in 1951, based on cruelty, and in April, 1953 her complaint was
dismissed after a jury verdict found that both spouses had been
guilty of cruelty. In May of 1953 the wife brought another divorce
action based on general allegations of cruelty and at the trial gave
evidence of cruelty occurring after the filing of the first suit but
before that suit was tried. The Supreme Court directed dismissal
of the suit. The opinion leaves doubt about the court's reasoning,
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period from November 1, 1955 to December 31, 1956.
,See Johnston, Family Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 335 (1951).
. 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-1-5 (1953). See also Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2 495
(1950). Marriages of persons under sixteen are void by Colorado low. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
* 90-1-4 (1953).
5 132 Colo. 495, 289 P.2d 900 (1955,.
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but apparently the judgment rests on two grounds: (a) The prior
action was a conclusive adjudication of the wife's own fault, so that
she was barred by recrimination. (b) The wife could not in this
action rely on acts of cruelty occurring before the trial of the prior
action. The first of these grounds is certainly valid. The second is
also proper as a means of discouraging repeated, harrassing suits
but it seems inconsistent with the language in Harms v. Harms.'
The Harms case held that it was reversible error to admit testi-
mony of acts of cruelty occurring after filing of the suit but before
trial. The court in Collins stated:
"The evidence in the first divorce action was not necessarily
limited to matters occurring prior to the date of the filing of
the complaint, but evidence of other facts, whether before
or after suit, which serve to give character to the acts of cruelty
alleged and proven, is admissible. This is true whether or not
plaintiff filed an amended complaint to embrace matters oc-
curring after the suit was commenced as she had a right to do
under our rules."
This might overrule sub silentio the court's statement in Harms
that "we do determine that defendant herein was bound by, and
should have been confined to, his bill of particulars filed herein on
motion and order during the process of arriving at issue in the
case. ' ' 8 Perhaps the rule of the Harms case only applies where a
bill of particulars has been filed and not where the parties rely
solely on the complaint to outline the issues.
The relationship between divorce and bankruptcy was involved
in one case, Todd v. Todd.' The Supreme Court held that where the
husband became a bankrupt before a final division of property in
the divorce action, the district court in the divorce case had juris-
diction to determine the interests of the spouses, and of the hus-
band's trustee in bankruptcy, to property standing in the joint
names of husband and wife.
A rather difficult question of the division of property on di-
vorce was raised by Lee v. Lee.10 During a large part of the parties'
marital life the husband loaned nearly all of his earnings to his
mother who used the money to pay off a loan on a valuable piece
of real estate. During this time the wife contributed her own funds
for the support of the family. The husband's mother died before the
divorce action was brought leaving the real estate to the husband.
The Supreme Court, stating that there would have been no inherit-
ance had it not been for the wife's contributions to the family,
directed that the inheritance should be taken into account in mak-
ing an allowance of propery to the wife. The case reaches what
appears to be an equitable result, but it never examines closely the
a 120 Colo. 212, 209 P.2d 552 (1949).
, 132 Colo. at 499, 289 P.2d at 90.
0 120 Colo. at 217, 209 P.2d at 554.
9 133 Colo. 1. 291 P.2d 386 (1956). On the general question of bankruptcy and family low, see
Joslin, Bankruptcy from a Family Law Perspective, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 789 (1956).
1 133 Colo. 128, 293 P.2d 293 (1956).
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purposes of awards of money in divorce. If the purpose of this
award was merely to divide the property of the parties, then clearly
the wife should not share in an inheritance received by the hus-
band. If the purpose was to reward the wife for years of faithful
support of the family, then she should share in any property owned
by the husband, no matter how acquired. This latter purpose is
one usually held relevant to alimony, not to a property division.1'
Although the exact label placed on the award did not matter in the
Lee case, it sometimes is extremely important. Therefore, it is
submitted that the courts ought to be more articulate about just
what kind of an award they are making to the wife in a case like
t1ais one. Superficially, this case would seem to be overruled by the
proposed new divorce law for Colorado," but if the award to the
wife is to be considered alimony, rather than a share of property,
the new statute would not apply to it. This makes it all the more
important for the courts to be clear about what they are doing
when they begin to award the husband's property to the wife in
divorce cases.
In Stephenson v. Stephenson,1" the Supreme Court reversed an
award of property to a wife in divorce on the ground that the
husband did not own as much property as the trial, court found
belonged to him and on the ground that the award as made below
completely impoverished him. The Supreme Court held that since
the lower court's decree was made solely on the basis of documents,
it was entitled to none of the usual presumptions in favor of cor-
rectness.
One other case 14 approved dismissal of a contempt citation
against a delinquent husband on the ground that the wife had let
arrears of alimony accumulate for several years without taking any
action. During this time the husband had been available for service
of process and his whereabouts known to the wife. The Supreme
Court, after stating that the contempt remedy is to be used cauti-
ously, found that the dismissal was within the trial court's discre-
tion. Presumably if the trial court had reached the opposite con-
clusion, its decision would have been affirmed also.
uSee, e.g., Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 52 N.E.2d 506 (1944).
'2 H. B. 70, § 5, omending Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-5 (2)(a) (1933). At present writing this
bill has passed both Houses of the Legislature but has not been signed by the Governor.
u8299 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1956).
14 Conway v. Conway, 299 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1956).
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The single case" in this category upheld a conveyance by a
dying man in trust to support research in lung cancer, rejecting
his wife's contention that the transfer was made in fraud of her
rights. The court stated the rule to be that a husband may convey
his property during his life to anyone he pleases, even though
the conveyance deprives his wife of her inheritance, provided that
the conveyance is bona fide and not merely colorable. The court
found that the bona fide nature of this conveyance was not af-
fected by the husband's subjecting the property to the payment of
all debts which he might contract during his lifetime.
PARENT AND CHILD
Two cases during the past year dealt with property transfers
between related persons. One of these, Shores v. Shores,16 held that
the presumption of a gift which arises when a father takes title
to land in the name of a daughter was rebutted. The court relied
on the facts that the daughter was an adult and was thus not the
beneficiary of any obligation of the father, that the father had
retained possession of the land, and that the parties had treated
similar transactions as if the father had retained ownership. On
these facts the presumption would seem to have been fully rebutted.
The other case mentioned 17 appeared to hold that there is no fiduci-
ary relationship between grandmother and granddaughter which
might create a presumption of undue influence or fraud in a trans-
fer of land from one to the other. The court affirmed the trial
judge's decision that the deeds could not be cancelled either for
alleged incompetence of the grandmother or for fraud or undue
influence.
The family car doctrine was applied in a case of relatively
slight interest, Ferguson v. Hurford.18 The defendant, mother of
the driver of the car, was shown to have taken title in her name,
registered the car in her name and taken out insurance in her
name. The court held her the owner in spite of the fact that her
son paid for the car and paid the expenses of its operation. As
owner, she was liable under the family car doctrine.
Two other unimportant cases, mentioned only for the sake of
completeness, are Hayes v. Hayes, 9 approving a decree which di-
vided custody and allowed the mother to remove her child from the
state, and Angelopoulos v. Wise,'0 which held that the evidence of
paternity in an action for contributory dependency was not clearly
sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant was the
father of the child.
Two cases involving dependency and adoption were decided
by the Supreme Court and are of considerable importance for law-
yers and judges. he first of these is Fackerell v. District Court.2
1
It arose as a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition
"s Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
"0303 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1956).
7 Hines v. Oliver, 133 Colo. 40, 291 P.2d 693 (1955).
Is 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955).
"9303 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1956).
20 133 Colo. 133, 293 P.2d 294 (1956).
" 133 Colo. 370, 295 P.2d 682 (1956).
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against the further hearing of a habeas corpus case by the district
court for Adams county. Petitioner had obtained an adoption decree
in the Moffat county court in 1952, based upon a consent by the
child's mother. The child had been in the petitioner's custody for
about a year before the adoption decree was granted, but the opin-
ion does not state how the petitioner acquired custody. In 1955
the child's mother filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Adams
county district court alleging that the adoption decree had been
obtained by fraud and seeking custody of her child. It was this
habeas corpus suit which petitioner sought to prevent by his peti-
tion for the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court refused the writ
of prohibition on the ground that the Moffat county court had had
no jurisdicion to grant the adoption decree. Apparently the reason
for the lack of jurisdiction was the absence of a prior relinquishment
decree.
It is not clear what the effect of the Fackerell decision will be.
The relinquishment statute does provide that no person may re-
ceive a child for purposes of adoption unless the child has been
relinquished under the statute.2" Yet the adoption statute continues
to provide, quite inconsistently, that a child may be adopted upon
the filing of the required consents. 3 The Supreme Court never
discusses this conflict in the statute. The Fackerell case thus seems
-Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-3 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1-9 (1953).
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to mean at least that no adoption by consent of the natural parent
can be decreed unless preceded by a relinquishment decree.
The adoption statute also provides that a decree of adoption
may be granted without consents where the. non-consenting parent
has abandoned the child.24 It seems clear that the relinquishment
statute was never intended to apply where the child had been
abandoned. The court in the Fackerell case stated that no question
of abandonment was involved, but it also seemed to make the
absolute rule that a decree of adoption without a preceding re-
linquishment is void on its face. On this point two earlier Colorado
cases are to the contrary, 25 neither of them being cited by the court.
Furthermore, the court never cites or refers to the adoption
statute which prohibits attack on adoption decrees for any reason,
jurisdictional or otherwise, more than two years after the decree.2"
It appeared that the attack in this case came nearly three years
after the adoption decree.27
Finally, the case contains a dictum that a parent cannot re-
linquish a child to an individual, 28 a point which has been raised
in the past in Colorado, and on which an attorney-general's opin-
ion has been given to the contrary.29 The applicable statute allows
the court in relinquishment to award custody of the child "to whom-
soever the court shall see fit. '2 0 One can only sum up the effect of
this case by stating that it creates doubt and confusion about the
present state of adoption laws.
The second important decision referred to is Kearney v. Blue.t
In this case a mother filed a dependency petition in the Denver
juvenile court asking for an order directing the father of her chil-
dren to support them. The Supreme Court seemed to hold that the
juvenile court had no jurisdiction over actions by a mother against
a father for support of the children. The opinion concludes with
the novel suggestion that the proper remedy is a divorce proceeding,
thus creating the impression that a wife must divorce her husband
in order to force him to support their children.
The Kearney case is the latest in a line of cases limiting the
juvenile court's jurisdiction over dependency. 2
The applicable statute defines a dependent child as one "who,
in the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care by its
parent or parents, where it appears that the parent or parents are
24 Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-16-6 (2)(b) (1953).
W Fulton v. Martensen, 129 Colo. 125, 267 P.2d 658 (1954); Moreau v. Buchholz, 124 Colo. 302,
236 P.2d 540 (1951).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1.16 (1953): "No attempt to invalidate a final decree of adoption
by reason af any jurisdictional or procedural defect shall be received by the court, or by any court
of this state, unless regularly filed with such court within two years following the entry of the
final decree."
The court states that the adoption decree was granted on October 23, 1952, and the petition
for habeas corpus filed on July 9, 1955. 133 Colo. at 371, 295 P.2d at 683.
29 133 Colo. at 374, 295 P.2d at 684.
's Op. Att'y Gen. Colo. No. 2221-52 (January 31, 1952).
0 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-6 (1953).
n301 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1956).
m Other such cases are Foxoruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511. 265 P.2d 233 (1954); Everett v.
Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307, 194 P.2d 909 (1948);
Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 290, 104 P.2d 612 (1940).
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failing or refusing to support or care for said child . . . . 3 The
statutes then give jurisdiction over dependent children to the
Juvenile Court.3 4 And the provision governing decrees in depen-
dency cases authorizes the juvenile court to "make such disposi-
tion of the child by adoption, guardianship, or otherwise, as seems
best for its moral and physical welfare."3 6 It has generally been
thought that this allowed the juvenile court in a proper case to
leave the child with its parents, including in the order a provision
for support. In a later section the juvenile court is given express
authority to leave the child in its own home subject to conditions
imposed by the court.36 Thus, the result of the Kearney case runs
counter to the statutory scheme. It places an unnecessary limitation
on the remedies of a wife and mother for support of her children at
a time when most authorities agree that non-support is one of the
most serious problems of modern American family law.
DELINQUENCY
Only one recent case3 7 need be mentioned here, and that one is
interesting only for a dictum which it contains to the effect that
"a single violation of any of the acts defining deliquency is not
enough upon which delinquency can be determined. It is the repe-
tition of such acts and the frequency thereof that creates a state
of delinquency or incorrigibility. 38 This dictum confuses de-
linquency with incorrigibility. The two are not the same. The de-
linquency statute very plainly says that a single violation of law
may amount to delinquency. 9 It is true, as an earlier case held,
4 0
that a series of offenses must be proved before a child can be held
incorrigible, but these offenses need not be violations of a criminal
statute. It is unfortunate that this dictum may be used to em-
barrass juvenile and county judges in the already difficult task of
handling children who come within the delinquency statute. These
judges need all the assistance and support possible for the per-
formance of their statutory duties.
SColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-1 (1953).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-9-2 (1) (1953).
e'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-i-6 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-9 (1953).
'Spencer v. People, 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
133 Colo. at 199, 292 P.2d at 972.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-1 (2) (1953).
40 Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928).
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